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ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the relative efficiency of two innovation
pre-shipment financing schemes that enable suppliers to obtain
financing for production: purchase order financing (POF, under
which financial institutions offer loans to suppliers by considering
the value of purchase orders) and buyer direct financing (BDF, un-
der which manufacturers lend directly to suppliers). Both schemes
are closely related to suppliers’ performance risk (whether the sup-
plier can deliver the order successfully). When the manufacturer
and the bank have symmetric information regarding the supplier’s
operational capabilitiy, we find that even though POF and BDF
yield the same payoffs, BDF allows more flexibility in contract
terms. However, when the manufacturer has superior informa-
tion, BDF leads to higher payoffs when the supplier is severely
financially constrained. The relative benefit of BDF is more pro-
nounced when the supply market contains a larger fraction of
inefficient suppliers, when efficiency gaps between suppliers are
greater, or when the manufacturer’s alternative sourcing option
is more expensive.
Christopher S. Tang, S. Alex Yang and Jing Wu (2019), “Financing Suppliers
under Performance Risk”, Foundations and TrendsR© in Technology, Information and
Operations Management: Vol. 12, No. 2-3, Special Issue on Emerging Technology &
Advances in Supply Chain Finance & Risk Management. Edited by P. Kouvelis, L.
Dong and D. Turcic, pp 1–17. DOI: 10.1561/0200000091.
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Introduction
As globalization broadens, many manufacturers (or intermediaries)
source products from small suppliers (or contract manufacturers), who
are often located in developing countries and lack of financing sources.
To meet the financing needs of the aforementioned suppliers, two in-
novative pre-shipment financing schemes have recently emerged. The
first is known as purchase order financing (POF), under which finan-
cial institutions lend to suppliers based on purchase orders issued by
reputable manufacturers. POF lenders include traditional commercial
banks and specialized POF lenders (Tice, 2010). Unlike asset-based
loans or factoring, which are backed by tangible assets, the repayment
of a POF loan depends on the supplier’s successful delivery of the
associated purchase order. Because a POF loan is only granted based on
purchase orders issued by creditworthy buyers, the major risk associated
with POF is not the buyer’s credit risk but the supplier’s performance
risk, i.e. that the supplier may fail to deliver the order according to
the buyer’s specifications on quality, timeliness, or compliance (Gustin,
2014). Under the second scheme, which we call buyer direct financing
(BDF), the manufacturer acts as both the buyer and the lender and
directly finances suppliers for production. BDF has been adopted by
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3manufacturers such as Rolls-Royce and GlaxoSmithKline, and supply
chain intermediaries such as Li & Fung.
As both POF and BDF are still taking shape, industry experts are
debating whether financial intermediaries (i.e. banks and specialized
lenders) or supply chain partners (i.e. manufacturers or supply chain
intermediaries) are in a better position to finance suppliers. On the one
hand, many critics argue that manufacturers should leave financing to
professionals with domain expertise. On the other, because the efficiency
of both POF and BDF hinges on supplier performance and because
manufacturers have better control over and knowledge of suppliers
(Fung et al., 2007), manufacturers can provide financing more efficiently.
For instance, manufacturers can design supply contracts to incentivize
suppliers to improve delivery performance. They often also have better
information than banks in terms of suppliers’ intrinsic operational
efficiency due to previous interactions, extensive auditing, or domain
knowledge of particular purchase orders. These observations motivated
us to examine two research questions more formally in this chapter. First,
by combining the roles of buyer and lender under BDF, which we refer
to as the manufacturer’s control advantage, can the manufacturer better
incentivize suppliers to improve their delivery performance under BDF?
Second, does the manufacturer’s information advantage about suppliers’
operational capabilities make BDF a superior financing scheme? And if
so, under what circumstances?
Focusing on the impact of different supply chain financing schemes
on supply risk, our paper is related to three research streams: supply
risk management, supply chain finance, and signaling games. We refer
the readers to Babich and Kouvelis (2018), Tang (2006), Yang and Birge
(2018), and Tang et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion on the related
literature.
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POF vs. BDF under symmetric information
To answer the first research question, we analyze a model consisting of
three parties: a manufacturer, a financially constrained supplier who can
exert costly and unobservable effort to improve delivery reliability, and
a bank operating in a competitive lending market (note that the bank
only plays a role in POF). Without access to other financing means,
the supplier can only borrow through either POF or BDF to cover
his production cost. To focus on the manufacturer’s control advantage
under BDF, we first assume that the manufacturer and the bank have
symmetric information about the supplier’s operational efficiency. This
assumption is relaxed in the next section.
2.1 Sourcing with POF
Consider a make-to-order supply chain comprising one manufacturer
and one supplier. To focus on supply risk, the demand faced by the
manufacturer is normalized to 1. The manufacturer sources the product
from the supplier, who incurs a production cost c > 0 (raw material,
wages, etc.) to execute the order.
Our models capture two salient features that are common among sup-
pliers seeking POF or BDF. First, the supplier is financially constrained.
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Specifically, we assume that the supplier has no cash on hand and only
has fixed assets (e.g. plants and equipment) that are indispensable to
his operation. The collateral value of the assets is a ≥ 0.
Second, the supplier is unreliable and can only deliver the order with
a certain probability. The supplier can improve the delivery probability
by exerting costly efforts that are not observable to any other parties.
The base delivery probability is scaled to 0. To increase the delivery
probability from 0 to e ∈ (0, 1), the supplier needs to exert effort that
is associated with a disutility (cost of effort) ke2 with k > 0. This
cost of effort is non-monetary and hence does not enter the supplier’s
cash flow. The supplier’s (effort) cost factor k captures the supplier’s
operational efficiency: A supplier with a lower k can achieve the same
delivery probability at a lower cost of effort than a supplier with higher
k. In this section, we assume that k is known to all parties. We later
extend this model to the case where the manufacturer and the supplier
know the exact value of k while the bank knows only the distribution.
The sequence of the game is as follows. Acting as the Stackelberg
leader, the manufacturer sets the contract terms and the supplier, as
the follower, decides whether to accept the supply contract. Without
loss of generality, we focus on the following contingent contract: The
manufacturer pays the supplier the contract price p upon successful
delivery and pays zero otherwise. After receiving a contract with price
p that is acceptable to him, the supplier takes the purchase order to
the bank and borrows c in the form of a POF loan to start production.
By considering the purchase order with contingent payment p and the
collateral value of the supplier’s fixed asset a, the bank decides whether
to lend c to the supplier and, if so, what interest rate iB to charge.
Under this POF loan contract, if the supplier delivers successfully,
he receives payment p from the manufacturer, pays the principal and
interest (1 + iB)c to the bank, and keeps the rest. If delivery is not
successful, the supplier receives no payment, the POF loan defaults,
the bank liquidates the supplier’s fixed assets and recovers a, and the
supplier is left with nothing. Therefore, the supplier’s objective is to
maximize his expected payoff ΠS , where
ΠS = e[p− (1 + iB)c]− (1− e)a− ke2. (2.1)
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As shown, ΠS consists of three parts: the expected gain upon successful
delivery (after paying off the loan plus interest) e[p − (1 + iB)c], the
expected loss of assets to the lender in the event of delivery failure
(1− e)a, and the cost of effort ke2. As our model is mainly motivated by
made-to-order products, we assume that once the goods are produced,
the supplier has to sell them to the manufacturer. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we normalize his outside option to 0, i.e. the supplier
accepts a contract only when ΠS ≥ 0.
Finally, to focus on the supplier’s performance risk, we assume that
the manufacturer has no credit risk and will pay the supplier as long
as the order is delivered successfully. The bank is assumed to operate
in a competitive lending market, and hence it sets the interest rate so
that the lending amount c equals its expected payoff discounted at the
bank’s cost of capital, which is normalized to zero.
Before characterizing the equilibrium contract, we first identify the
first-best solution: In a centralized chain, we find that the manufacturer
will source from the supplier if and only if v24k ≥ c. The resulting delivery
probability is v2k , and the corresponding chain payoff is
v2
4k − c.1 Finally,
to avoid trivial cases, we assume that the supplier’s cost c and his asset
level a satisfy: 0 ≤ a ≤ c ≤ v24k .
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of different regions under the optimal POF contract.
1We refer the readers to Tang et al. (2018) for the detailed derivation of this
result and the following ones in this chapter.
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The optimal contract and corresponding equilibrium outcome as
illustrated in Figure 2.1. As shown, when the supplier’s asset value a
is relatively large (Region I in Figure 2.1), the supplier has a stronger
incentive to exert more effort to increase his delivery probability in order
to protect his assets. Recognizing this, it is optimal for the manufacturer
to set the contract price at the lowest level that is acceptable to the
supplier. As a decreases, the supplier’s delivery probability in equilibrium
also declines. The decline in both a and the delivery probability leads
to a higher interest rate. In Region II, as the supplier’s asset value a
is low, the supplier has little to lose and hence is less incentivized to
exert effort to increase delivery probability. Anticipating this, the bank
increases the interest rate charged under POF. To offset the increasing
financial burden borne by the supplier, the manufacturer offers a price
that decreases in a. As such, the manufacturer’s payoff is lowered as
the supplier becomes more financially constrained. Finally, when the
supplier’s net financing need (c − a) is sufficiently large (Region III),
it is too costly for the manufacturer to offer a price that is acceptable
to herself and the bank. Hence, sourcing from the reliable supplier is
simply unprofitable.
2.2 Joint sourcing and financing under BDF
As shown previously, both the total supply chain payoff and delivery
probability are both lower under POF relative to the first-best bench-
mark. Can such inefficiency be mitigated under BDF, which allows the
manufacturer to jointly determine the sourcing and loan terms?
Under BDF, the bank does not play a role and the manufacturer
determines both the contingent price p and interest rate iM (for lending
c to the supplier). Upon successful delivery, the manufacturer deducts
the principal and interest (1 + iM )c from p and pays the rest to the
supplier. When the supplier fails to deliver, the manufacturer does not
pay the supplier and seizes the supplier’s assets a to partially recover
the loan. To compare BDF and POF directly, we assume that the
manufacturer’s cost of capital is also zero, and the liquidation value of
the asset is a, both the same as the bank’s. The interaction between the
supplier and manufacturer under BDF is analogous to that under POF.
8 POF vs. BDF under symmetric information
First, under given (p, iM ), the supplier’s best response and participation
condition are similar to that under POF, with iB being replaced by
iM . Anticipating this, the manufacturer chooses p and iM jointly to
maximize her payoff ΠM = e(v − p) + [e(1 + iM )c+ (1− e)a− c] , the
sum of the expected operational savings and her financing earnings
from the BDF loan.
By analyzing the above game, we find that BDF does not improve
supply chain efficiency relative to POF despite the manufacturer’s
ability to jointly optimize the contingent payment and interest rate.
The reason is as follows. In both POF and BDF, the supplier’s incentive
to exert effort is determined solely by the difference between his payoff
when the order is delivered and that when the order is not delivered.
Under POF, the contingent nature of the supply contract already equips
the manufacturer with a lever to maximize the above difference, which
cannot be further improved under BDF.
That said, BDF offers the manufacturer more flexibility in setting
the contract price and interest rates jointly. Specifically, the price pB
and interest rate iBM under BDF can induce optimal performance as
long as pB − (1 + iBM )c stays constant. Such flexibility can be of value.
For instance, in certain markets, regulations may cap interest rates at
certain levels, which renders POF infeasible when the supplier’s asset
level is very low. However, BDF allows the manufacturer to facilitate
financing by lowering the contract price and interest rate simultaneously.
3
POF vs. BDF under the manufacturer’s
information advantage
To answer the second question, we extend the above model by consider-
ing the case in which the supplier can be either efficient or inefficient
in terms of their operational capabilities. The cost factor k is kH for
the efficient ones (τ = H) and kL for the inefficient one (τ = L), where
kL > kH > 0. Thus, the efficient supplier incurs lower (effort) costs
than the inefficient supplier in order to achieve the same delivery proba-
bility. The actual type is known to the manufacturer, but the bank only
knows the distribution: The supplier is efficient with probability λ and
inefficient with probability (1−λ). Intuitively, λ is probably higher in a
developed country than an emerging market. Because the manufacturer
knows the supplier’s actual type and the bank is not involved under
BDF, the performance of BDF remains the same as before. However,
POF may become less efficient in this case due to the bank’s information
disadvantage. In the following, we first establish how POF is influenced
by the manufacturer’s private information, and then identify the benefit
of BDF under such information asymmetry.
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3.1 The impact of the manufacturer’s private information on POF
To model the manufacturer’s private information, we extend the basic
POF model in the last section by incorporating a signaling component.
First, as the sender of the signal, the manufacturer offers a supply
contract with price p (the signal) to the supplier. The supplier then
takes the contract to obtain POF financing from the bank (the receiver
of the signal). Upon observing the signal p, the bank forms a posterior
belief about the supplier’s type using Bayes’ rule and offers financing
terms accordingly. As in the signaling games literature, we adopt the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the relevant equilibrium concept.
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Figure 3.1: Regions of the stable dominant PBE.
Notes. CL represents costless separating; SA represents separating based on the sup-
plier’s acceptance constraint, P represents pooling, N represents that no equilibrium
exists. The illustration is generated using kL
kH
= 1.5 and λ = 0.5.
By characterizing both the separating and pooling equilibria, and
using both Pareto dominance and the Intuitive Criterion, the different
regions of the stable dominant PBE is illustrated in Figure 3.1. First,
when the supplier’s asset value a is relatively high (Region CL), the
manufacturer simply offers the same contract as under symmetric infor-
mation, which can already signal the supplier’s type. This is because in
this region, the price offered to the efficient supplier under symmetric
information is already lower than the lowest price an inefficient supplier
would accept even if the bank mistakenly believed that he was efficient.
As such, the manufacturer’s payoff under asymmetric information is
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identical to that under symmetric information. In other words, signaling
is costless to the manufacturer.
Second, where the supplier’s asset value a is slightly below v216kL
and the net financing need (c − a) is medium (Region SA), unlike in
Region CL, the bank will no longer treat the price under symmetric
information as a credible signal that the supplier is efficient. However, it
is still cost-efficient for the manufacturer to deviate the price offered to
the efficient supplier from the optimal one under symmetric information
in order as a credible signal. In particular, the manufacturer signals
that the supplier is efficient by making the contract unacceptable to an
inefficient one.
As the supplier’s asset a drops further while the net financing need
c − a remains not too high (Region P in Figure 3.1), separating the
two types of suppliers is either infeasible ( c ≥
(
1 + 2kLkH
)
a) or less
cost-efficient than pooling (c <
(
1 + 2kLkH
)
a). Thus, the stable dominant
equilibrium is a pooling one. In equilibrium, the manufacturer offers
a single price regardless of the supplier’s type. In response, the bank
treats all suppliers as having cost factor equal to the weighted average
kW = λkH + (1 − λ)kL, and hence offers a single interest rate to all
suppliers.
Finally, where a is small and c − a is large (Region N), neither
pooling nor separating equilibria exist and hence the manufacturer
does not source from the supplier, regardless of his type. To elaborate,
when c − a > v28kW , under the belief that the supplier’s cost factor
is the weighted average one, the bank is not willing to lend unless
the manufacturer offers a price greater than v, which is clearly not
economical. Therefore, no pooling equilibrium exists. On the other
hand, separating equilibrium does not exist for the same reason as we
explained in Region P when c ≥
(
1 + 2kLkH
)
a.
In summary, due to the three-party supply chain setting and the
specific mechanism that the manufacturer relies on for separation, i.e.,
the supplier’s acceptance constraint, the manufacturer’s information
advantage has bifurcating impacts on the performance of POF. On the
one hand, when the supplier’s asset level is not too low, signaling the
supplier’s cost factor through the sourcing contract is actually costless.
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However, as the supplier’s asset level drops, signaling the true type of
the supplier quickly becomes too costly, leading to two scenarios: First,
when c − a is low, the manufacturer offers the pooling price and the
bank treats both types of suppliers as the weighted average; and second,
when c− a is high, no equilibrium exists that allows the manufacturer
to source from the efficient supplier, and hence the manufacturer has to
give up a valuable sourcing opportunity.
3.2 The Benefit of BDF under Information Asymmetry
Armed with the stable dominant equilibrium associated with the sig-
naling game under POF, we now examine the conditions under which
BDF is more appealing than POF when the manufacturer has an in-
formation advantage over the bank. Because the bank is not involved
under BDF, the information asymmetry between the manufacturer and
the bank has no impact on the performance of BDF. In other words,
even with information asymmetry, the manufacturer’s and supplier’s
payoffs under BDF equals to POF under symmetric information. Thus,
the benefit of BDF for the manufacturer (relative to POF) that can
be attributed to information asymmetry is captured by the difference
in the manufacturer’s payoffs between the symmetric information case
and the asymmetric one. Also, we note that the information asymme-
try does not adversely influence the performance of POF when the
manufacturer faces an inefficient supplier. Therefore, in the rest of this
section, we focus on the scenario in which the manufacturer sources
from efficient suppliers. Such a focus is also supported by anecdotal
evidence that many manufacturers only offer BDF to suppliers with
good track records.
Combining the above results, we can examine the conditions under
which BDF is preferable as follows. First, we note that BDF is more
valuable to the manufacturer when the supplier’s asset value a is low.
Therefore, it is more beneficial for the manufacturer when she focuses
her financing capacity on helping her most financially constrained
suppliers, as well as offering financing to a supplier when the value
of the supplier’s assets shrinks, such as during an economic downturn.
This result provides a plausible explanation for the emergence of BDF
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during financial crises. For example, during the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis, Li & Fung offered direct financing to its cash-strapped suppliers
in Indonesia (Tang, 2006).
Second, BDF is more appealing to the manufacturer when the
efficient supplier’s cost factor kH is low, i.e. when the supplier is more
cost efficient. Therefore, it could be more beneficial to directly lend
to efficient suppliers who need help with acquiring new equipment to
improve their operational efficiency.
Third, BDF is more valuable for the manufacturer when the market
consists of mostly inefficient suppliers (i.e. when λ is low). Note that as
λ decreases, the weighted average cost factor kW becomes larger, leading
to two implications: The manufacturer offers a higher contract price
under pooling (Region P ) or fails to source from the supplier (Region N).
As such, BDF is an effective financing scheme for manufacturers who
source from developing markets comprised predominantly of inefficient
suppliers.
Fourth, the benefit of BDF also increases as her outside option v
becomes more expensive. When v is larger, we can see from Figure
3.1 that Regions SA, P , and N expand. Furthermore, under POF, it
is more likely that the manufacturer will incur signaling costs or not
source from the supplier. As such, BDF becomes more appealing to the
manufacturer when the supplier is more specialized and the alternative
sourcing option is particularly expensive (i.e. when v is high). Consistent
with the anecdotal evidence, manufacturers that work with specialized
suppliers, such as Rolls-Royce and GSK, are among the pioneers of
directly financing their suppliers.
Finally, while we mainly focus on the benefits of BDF for the
manufacturer, owing to her leader position in the supply chain, BDF
can also improve profitability for the efficient supplier. Specifically, the
efficient supplier would directly benefit from BDF in Region N , as the
presence of information asymmetry prohibits the efficient supplier from
obtaining a supply contract under POF that he could secure under BDF
otherwise. In addition, in Region SA, the contract price under POF
is lower than that under BDF as the manufacturer must, in order to
signal credibly to the bank that the supplier is indeed efficient, offer a
lower contract price under POF. As such, the supplier’s payoff is also
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adversely affected. In summary, the above result suggests that BDF
can also benefit the efficient supplier under information asymmetry,
achieving a win–win situation for both parties in the supply chain.
4
Conclusion
By focusing on understanding the relative efficiency of two innovative
financing schemes (POF and BDF) in managing suppliers’ endoge-
nous performance risk, this chapter reveal two important managerial
implications. First, the relative benefit of BDF resides more on the man-
ufacturer’s information advantage than her control advantage. Second,
by formally analyzing the financial implications of the manufacturer’s in-
formation advantage, we identify operational and financial environments
in which manufacturers may benefit more by financing their suppliers
directly. Specifically, we find that manufacturers should direct their
financing capacity to suppliers who are extremely constrained finan-
cially, and those who are more specialized and costly to replace, and/or
those in need of upgrade their facilities for operational improvement.
As such, BDF is likely to be a valuable financing option in high-tech
and pharmaceutical industries where the above characteristics are com-
monly observed. In addition, our results also reveal that BDF is more
valuable in emerging economies with weak financial sectors that have
limited information acquisition capability, and huge supplier quality
heterogeneity, and during financial crises when the supplier’s financing
need is high.
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16 Conclusion
As the first attempt at comparing POF and BDF, this research
can be extended in many aspects. For example, this chapter focuses on
performance risk as captured in a binary distribution. Examining yield
uncertainty following a continuous distribution could further generalize
the result in this paper. In addition, our single-supplier model can
be extended to a multi-supplier framework, including both multiple
competing suppliers and/or suppliers producing complementary com-
ponents. While we expect that the qualitative results in this chapter
remain valid, the interaction between different suppliers under endoge-
nous effort choice may further enrich our understanding. Information
asymmetry is another dimension along which the model can be extended.
Currently, we consider only information asymmetry regarding the sup-
plier’s operational efficiency. Further studies on the manufacturer’s
superior information regarding other parameters such as the supplier’s
asset level, the manufacturer’s outside option, and others can also be
promising. Furthermore, for tractability, we focus on a single-period
model in this chapter. In the future, this modeling framework can be
extended into a multi-period setting with learning, which may allow
additional insights to be generated. Finally, due to data availability, our
results are connected only with anecdotal evidence. However, should
data become available, empirical research may be conducted to verify
the various predictions that this chapter generates.
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